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Abstract—We propose an efficient protocol for secure 
comparison of integers when both integers are shared between 
two parties. Such protocols are useful for implementing secure 
auctions. The proposed protocol’s computational complexity is 
roughly half the complexity of the best known efficient protocol. 
The efficiency of the proposed protocol stems from the removal 
of the XOR computation which is a time consuming operation.  
 
Index Terms—Integer comparison, secure protocol, secure 
auctions, exclusive-OR, privacy.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
ECURE comparison can be used to perform secure auctions 
as follows. The two parties performing the auction are A 
and B. A can be thought of as the auction house and B as an 
accounting company. A and B have shares of the current 
highest bid X. A’s share is XA and B’s share is XB. The next 
bidder C sends the shares, YA and YB of his bid Y to A and B 
respectively. A and B then conduct a secure protocol to decide 
if Y > X or not. If Y > X then Y becomes the current highest 
bid and the next bidder sends the shares of her bid to A and B. 
The comparison protocol is again repeated to check if the new 
bid is greater than the current highest bid. We assume that A 
and B are semi-honest (or they follow the protocol) because 
the actions of A and B can be checked after the auctions have 
completed. The proposed protocol is a modification of the 
most efficient known protocol of [1,2].    
Our contributions are: The main reason why the protocol of 
[1] is computationally complex is because the computation of 
X⊕Y with shares of bits of X and Y requires 2l encryptions 
and 2l decryptions, where l is the number of bits in X or Y. 
The reason why X⊕Y is needed for comparison is to find out 
which bits of X and Y are the same. We achieve this by 
simply computing the difference, D,  between the individual 
bits of X and Y. The digits of D can therefore be 0, 1, or -1. 
To check if a given subset of digits of D, are 0, we check if the 
sum of the products of the digits of that subset and consecutive 
powers of 2 is 0. Note that if a subset of digits of D are all 0 
then the corresponding bits of X and Y are equal. 
Related work: Secure comparison protocols have been 
implemented using Yao’s garbled circuits [3], using 
encryption of bits as quadratic and non-quadratic residues 
modulo an RSA modulus [4], homomorphic encryption 
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[1,2,5], and other adhoc techniques [6,7]. The most efficient 
amongst these is the protocol of [1] because it makes use of a 
smaller plaintext space for the encryption scheme. We use the 
same encryption scheme of [1] and describe it next.   
Homomorphic encryption: To generate the keys for 
encryption, parameters k, t, and l are defined such that k > t > 
l. k is the number of bits in an RSA modulus n, such that n = 
pq, where p and q are primes. u and vp, and vq are another set 
of primes that are chosen such that vp | (p-1) and vq | (q-1) [2]. 
u has at least l+2 bits and v = vp vq has at least t bits. The 
shares of X and Y are in Zu. We choose random elements 
,  ∈ 
∗
 such that the multiplicative order of h is v = vp vq 
and g has order uv. The public key is now pk = (n, g, h, u) and 
the secret key is sk = (p, q, vp, vq). The plaintext space is Zu 
and the ciphertext space is ∗ . To encrypt a message m ∈ Zu, 
we choose a random 2t-bit integer r, to obtain the ciphertext c, 
as follows, 	
,   	 		. The decryption of c 
can be done as follows,      . Since gv has 
order uv and u is very small, one can build a table containing 
values of   mod n and corresponding values of m. In our 
protocol we just need to check if c encrypts the message 0. 
This can easily be done by checking if cv mod n = 1. The 
following equations make the above encryption scheme 
homomorphic.  
	
, 	
	
, 		  		
  
		,   . 
	
, 
		  		
		, . 
 
Let the l-bit integers being compared be X = (xl , …, x1) and Y 
= (yl , …, y1). Parties A and B have additive shares of each bit 
of X and Y. Therefore A has XA = (xlA , …, x1A) and YA = (ylA 
, …, y1A) and B has XB = (xlB , …, x1B) and YB = (ylB , …, y1B) 
such that xi = xiA + xiB mod u, and yi = yiA + yiB mod u, where 
xiA, xiB, yiA,yiB ∈ Zu, i = 1, …, l. Note that xi and yi are bits. A 
sharing of bit y is written as [y] and denotes y’s shares with A 
and B; namely yA and yB, such that y = yA+yB mod u. The 
protocol in [1] is given below for completeness.  
Protocol 1: Secure comparison. 
Input: A has XA and YA and B has XB and YB. 
Output: Y > X or Y ≤ X. 
1. A and B compute shares [di], i = 1, …, l, where  
di = xi + yi - 2xiyi = xi⊕yi. Note di ∈ {0,1}.  
2. A and B compute shares [ci], i = 1, …, l, where 
ci = xi – yi + 1 + ∑ !"!#$%& . 
If there exists i such that all the bits (xl , …, xi+1) are 
identical to the bits (yl , …, yi+1) and xi – yi + 1 = 0, then 
Y > X. Note that (xl , …, xi+1) and (yl , …, yi+1) are the 
same if and only if (dl , …, di+1) are all 0 or  
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equivalently ∑ !"!#$%&  0.  
3. Let (i and )i be the shares of ci that A and B have locally 
computed. A computes encryptions Epk((i, ri) and sends 
them all to B.  
4. B chooses random si ∈ Zu* and $ as a 2t bit integer and 
computes a random encryption of the form  
*$	  	
($ , $
+,,,
-
		.  
Note that if ci = 0 then *$	is an encryption of 0, otherwise       
it is a random non-zero value. B sends these encryptions 
to A in randomly permuted order. 
5. A uses his secret key to check if any of the received 
encryptions are encryptions of 0. If this is the case he 
outputs Y > X, otherwise he outputs Y ≤ X. 
The problem with the above method is that step 1 is 
computationally intensive. We illustrate this by giving a 
protocol for computing p⊕q, where p,q ∈ {0,1}. A has shares 
pA and qA and B has shares pB and qB of p and q respectively 
such that p = pA+pB mod u, and q = qA+qB mod u. Therefore 
p⊕q = p + q – 2pq = (pA+pB) + (qA+qB) - 2(pA+pB) (qA+qB) 
         = (pA+qA) + (pB+qB) - 2(pA qA+pB qB+ pA qB+ pB qA)   (1)  
A can compute (pA+qA) and pA qA and B can compute (pB+qB) 
and pB qB. However computing pA qB and pB qA is not straight 
forward. Protocol 2 below shows how to compute pA qB. 
Protocol 2: Compute pA qB. 
Input: A has pA and and B has qB. 
Output: A has pA qB – r and B has r. 
1. A sends Epk(pA) to B. 
2. B chooses r
 
∈ Zu and computes Epk(pA qB – r mod u) using 
the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme and 
sends it to A. 
3. A decrypts the received encryption to get pA qB – r. 
Therefore the shares of pA qB are (pA qB – r, r). pB qA can be 
similarly computed and hence p⊕q. 
II. PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
We present a method that eliminates the computation of 
xi⊕yi in step 1 of Protocol 1. This reduces the complexity of 
Protocol 1 by half. Our protocol is given below. 
Protocol 3: Secure comparison. 
Input: A has XA and YA and B has XB and YB. 
Output: Y > X or Y ≤ X. 
1. A and B compute shares [di], i = 1, …, l, where  
di = xi - yi. Note di ∈ {0,1, -1}.  
2. A and B compute shares [ci], i = 1, …, l, where 
ci = xi – yi + 1 + ∑ !"!#$%& 2"/!%&. 
The rest of the protocol is the same as Protocol 1. 
 
Protocol Correctness: If there exists i such that all the bits (xl 
, …, xi+1) are identical to the bits (yl , …, yi+1) and xi – yi + 1 = 
0, then Y > X. This is equivalent to: If there exists i such that 
all the bits (dl , …, di+1) are 0 and di + 1 = 0, then Y > X (di’s 
are from step 1 of Protocol 3). Let wi = ∑ !"!#$%& 2"/!%& = 
2"  2
0"/& ⋯ 2
"/$$%&, where ! ∈ 20,1, 415. Note 
that if we had left wi = ∑ !"!#$%&  (like in step 1 of Protocol 1), 
then wi can be 0 even if all the dj’s are not all 0, making the 
protocol incorrect. This happens because dj can have a value 
of -1. By multiplying the dj’s by consecutive powers of 2 the 
sum wi = ∑ !
"
!#$%& 2
"/!%&
, is 0 if and only if each dj, j = i+1, 
…, l is 0 (see Lemma 1 below). Therefore if there exists i such 
that wi = 0 and di + 1 = 0, then Y > X. Thus a comparison can 
be performed without explicitly computing any XOR.  
 
Lemma 1: Let w = ∑ !"!#& 2!, where ! ∈ 20,1, 415. w = 0 if 
and only if !  0, ∀7  1,… , 9. 
Proof: If all !  0 then it follows that w = 0. Now we show 
that if w = 0 then all !  0. Consider the digits (dl , …, d1), 
where	! ∈ 20,1, 415. Let the ith digit, di be the leftmost non-
zero digit in (dl , …, d1). Therefore di ∈ {1, -1}. Since 
∑ 2! :	2$$/&!#& , it follows that w ≠ 0 if any of its digits is non-
zero. Therefore all the digits ! must be 0 for w to be 0.  
 
Remark: The largest power of 2 used in step 2 of Protocol 3 is 
2l-1. Since u has l+2 bits it is always greater than 2l-1. 
Therefore wi = ∑ d!=  d!> 	"!#$%& 2"/!%&		 
	∑ d! 	
"
!#$%& 2
"/!%&		  	∑ d! 	
"
!#$%& 2
"/!%&
, where d!=	and 
d!> are shares of d!. Note that the sum ∑ d! 	"!#$%& 2"/!%& :  
because d! 	 ∈ 20,1, 415 and ∑ 2! :	2$$/&!#& . 
III. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a protocol for comparison of two integers, 
X and Y, when two parties A and B have additive shares of X 
and Y. Our protocol has half the computational complexity of 
the most efficient known protocol of [1]. Our protocol 
achieves efficiency by eliminating the computation of XOR 
which is a time consuming task. The communication 
complexity of our protocol is the same as the protocol of [1]. 
The proof of security of our protocol when A and B are semi-
honest consists of a simulator that is given the inputs and 
outputs of the corrupted party and  produces messages that are 
identically distributed to the messages it receives in a real run 
of the protocol.  
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